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Just east of Petersburg Virginia -
near the rim of “The Crater” on Sunday, January 29, 1865 - a white
flag appeared on the Confederate side of the lines. A delegation of
commissioners from Jefferson Davis (Alexander Stephens, vice
president of the Confederacy, John A. Campbell, a former U. S.
Supreme Court Justice - now assistant secretary of war, and Robert
Hunter, president pro tem of the Senate) had arrived to be taken to
a meeting with Union representatives to discuss “issues and options
for peace.” Hopeful rumors the war was ending soon circulated on
both sides of the lines. The ensuing meeting on February 3rd aboard
the steamer River Queen became known as the Hampton Roads
Conference.
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The River Queen
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This last hope
for some sort of negotiated end to the war was arranged through the
friendship of Francis Preston Blair Sr. with Abraham Lincoln and
Jefferson Davis. Blair was an anti-slavery Missouri politician and
advisor to presidents back to Andrew Jackson. With a stagecoach
version of shuttle diplomacy between Washington and Richmond in
January, Blair was able to get both presidents to send
representatives to try to discuss a way to end hostilities. Since
Davis, in his authorizing letter referred to “two countries” while
Lincoln referred to “one country,” in his letters, the odds were
against any success.
With his reelection and the
continuing success of Grant and Sherman as they squeezed whatever
life there was left in Lee’s forces between their armies, Lincoln
could afford to be magnanimous in agreeing to this conference while
Davis, under fire in the south for his handling of the war, needed
some political cover to show he was open to other options to end the
conflict. Shelby Foote notes that, during the diplomatic exchanges
leading to the meeting, Lincoln, the sly political fox and Davis,
the stubborn, prickly hedgehog – “swapped roles.” Lincoln was
intransigent and unyielding on his terms for peace while Davis
became “politically shifty, and secretive” to hold off disgruntled
opponents in the Confederate Congress while not yielding anything.
Lincoln had initially sent
secretary of state William Seward to meet with the Stephens’
Delegation but after General Grant sent a letter to Stanton
reporting that he “was convinced,… intentions are good and their
desire sincere to restore peace and union” and expressing regret,
“that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an interview with the two named in
this dispatch, if not all three now within our lines.” Lincoln
encouraged by Grant’s telegram, and maybe believing for the first
time that there was a chance for some success, sent him these words:
“Say to the gentlemen that I will meet them personally…as soon as I
can get there.” He then left two hours later with taking only his
valet. Although Grant was responsible for Lincoln’s attendance at
the conference he doesn’t speak of his role in doing so in his
memoirs – most notably saying of the delegation, for which he was a
gracious host, in true Grant fashion, “I never was ready to admit
they were representatives of any government.”
The Hampton Roads Conference
deserves more attention that it usually gets in the few paragraphs
accorded it in most histories if only for the insights it provides
into its participants as they tried to find a way, against great
odds, to stop the killing. It was a four-hour drama of give and take
with argued positions and some humor as only Lincoln could provide
in tense situations. By agreement, it was an informal conference
with no clerks or secretaries to take any notes so we have only the
memory of its participants for the record.
While each side wrote a report on
the conference summarizing it for their respective governments, I’ve
found the best detailed account of the meeting itself in a two
volume set of books by Alexander Stephens written in 1867 – “A
Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States; Its Causes,
Character, Conduct and Results .” I’ve used several sources for this
article but most of its details come from Stephens’ account which
also seems to be the prime source for other briefer accounts in
other histories. (Unlike Davis – who he seldom even saw - Stephens
knew the war was lost and had become known along with others in the
south as a “submissionist.”)
The Stephens’ group entered the
meeting salon first. Lincoln and Seward then came in greeting the
delegation – some as old acquaintances and friends – and being
introduced to others. Memories of past associations were shared and
various inquiries made about mutual friends – with Stephens
reminding Lincoln how they had worked together while congressmen for
the election of Zachary Taylor in 1848. (It was also during the
re-acquaintance period that Lincoln, remembering Stephens as a small
man, first saw him there as a much larger man until Stephens removed
his heavy coat prompting the president to remark later to Grant,
“Did you ever see such a small ear in such a large shuck.”)
Amenities over, Stephens asked
Lincoln: “Well Mr. President, is there no way of putting an end to
the present trouble, and bringing about a restoration of the general
good feeling then existing between the different states and sections
of the country?” Lincoln replied that there was only one way that he
knew of and that was for those resisting the laws of the Union to
cease that resistance.
Stephens then explored the plan put
forth by Blair, when Blair had met with Davis, which called for a
armistice while the two sides somehow joined together to drive the
invading French out of Mexico - enforcing the Monroe Doctrine.
Lincoln told Stephens that he knew that Blair had certain ideas but
that he did not hear of them before Blair’s initial trip to
Richmond, telling Stephens as he did, after Blair’s first trip, in a
letter to Davis, that his condition for peace was the restoration of
the Union.
Stephens asked if a policy could be
developed “which would probably lead to a restoration of the Union,
without further bloodshed, would it not be advisable to act on it
even without the pledge of ultimate restoration being required?”
Lincoln replied that the settlement of the existing difficulties was
of supreme importance and the only basis on which he would entertain
a proposition for a settlement was the recognition and
reestablishment of the National Authority throughout the land.
Judge Campbell then asked about
conditions for restoration if the South would consent to Lincoln’s
terms. The delegation had agreed to ask these questions if the
Monroe Plan proposal failed although it’s doubtful that Davis would
have wanted this line if inquiry pursued. This request led to a
discussion of slavery. Seward said that Lincoln could not express
himself more clearly or more forcibly than he had in his recent
message to Congress – “In presenting the abandonment of armed
resistance to the National Authority, on the part of the insurgents
as the only indispensable condition to ending the war, I retract
nothing heretofore said as to slavery…while I remain in my present
position, I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation
Proclamation…”
Seward then informed the
commissioners that Congress had just passed a constitutional
amendment banning slavery throughout the country – the whole country
- while they were making their way to the meeting. Lincoln added
that he still favored some sort of compensation for the loss of
slaves if Congress approved. Shelby Foote says this news of the
amendment came as “a considerable shock to the delegates but that
was mild compared to what followed when Hunter attempted to
summarize Lincoln’s terms with a question” – “Mr. President, if we
understand you correctly, you think that we of the Confederacy have
committed treason; that we have forfeited our rights and are proper
subjects for the hangman. Is that what your words imply? Lincoln
answered: “Yes, you have stated the proposition better than I did.
That’s about the size of it.” After further discussion and a few
Lincoln “tension easing stories” Hunter was able to conclude that
“We shall not be hanged as long as you are president: if we behave
ourselves.”
Stephens’ account of the amendment
news has Seward making the point that the passing of the amendment
was a “war measure” and if the war were to end it would probably not
be adopted by enough states to make it a part of the Constitution.
By inference, he was suggesting - “end the war and defeat the
amendment.” Stephens then asked if the Confederates states would be
restored to representation in Congress with Lincoln saying, in his
opinion, that they ought to be but that he could not enter into any
agreement on this or any subject with “parties in arms against the
government.” Hunter suggested to Lincoln that he might follow the
precedent of Charles I of England who had negotiated with people in
arms against him. Lincoln replied that while Seward was the expert
on history, he knew enough history to recall that Charles eventually
lost his head.
During the discussion on slavery,
Stephens also writes that Lincoln referred to the Emancipation
Proclamation as a war measure and that he would leave it to the
courts to decide its future after the war but that he would “never
change or modify the terms of the Proclamation in the slightest
particular.” There was some more somewhat legalist discussion on
slavery and how it should be ended according to Stephens but the
result in all scenarios was the same – it would be ended and slavery
would be no more in the United States.
Had the delegates strictly followed
Davis’ directions the conference would have ended quickly - as soon
as Lincoln made it clear there would be no temporary cessation of
war for any reason, no “two country” solution and no more slavery.
However, as we have seen, the meeting did not end abruptly but
continued, in the hope they might yet find some way to achieve an
honorable peace. It also seems apparent the southerners knew their
cause was lost and began to look ahead to how they and their states
might be treated and brought back into a united country. In the end,
despite the common good will, Davis had not authorized his delegates
to negotiate, while Lincoln would not negotiate with rebel forces.
The issues would be settled on the battlefield.
In saying goodbye, Lincoln said to
Stephens, “Well Stephens, there has been nothing we could do for our
country. Is there anything I can do for you personally.” He first
replied “Nothing,” but then said, “Unless you can send me my nephew
who has been a prisoner on Johnson’s Island.” (Lincoln also politely
promised to have Grant consider an exchange of prisoners and,
according to Stephens, to reconsider an armistice saying – as if
granting a favor – “I will reconsider it but I do not think my mind
will change …”)
George Meade recorded the end of
the attempt for peace in a letter to his wife: “Today they (the
delegation) returned to Richmond, but what was the result of their
visit no one knows. At the present moment, 8 p.m., the artillery on
our lines is in full blast, clearly proving at this moment there is
no peace.”
Lincoln upon returning to the White
House had Stephens’ nephew, Lt. John A. Stephens, who was captured
at Vicksburg brought to a meeting with him in Washington where he
gave him a pass through Union lines. (He also gave him some pictures
of himself saying, “They are a curiosity down your way.”)
Upon their return, the Stephens’
Delegation reported to Davis. He thought Lincoln had acted in bad
faith. Davis said it was clear that there would be no peace short of
“unconditional submission on the part of the people of the
Confederacy with an entire change of their social fabric throughout
the south.” He would then use this conclusion to promote “the
necessity of renewed and desperate efforts for the preservation of
themselves and their institutions.” Stephens writes that, “When the
program of action, thus indicated by Mr. Davis…was clearly resolved
upon, I, then, for the first time, in view of all the surroundings,
considered the Cause to be as utterly hopeless.” He then left
Richmond after telling Davis he was going home to Georgia to stay
where he eventually welcomed his paroled nephew – the only tangible
result of the Hampton Roads Conference.
Books referenced in this
article:
(Note: Roll-over a book title to bring up more information on that
book; click the book title to purchase from Amazon.com. Part of the proceeds from any book purchased from Amazon
through the CCWRT website are returned to the CCWRT to support its
education and preservation programs.)
More
Civil War titles at the Roundtable Bookstore |
Related Links:
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Abraham Lincoln
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Jefferson Davis
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Francis
Preston Blair Sr.
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Alexander
Hamilton Stephens
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John A.
Campbell
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Robert M.T.
Hunter
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William
H. Seward
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Ulysses S. Grant
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