 The number of books published
concerning the Civil War or some aspect of that conflict is
staggering. Books continue to appear on a regular basis which shows
no sign of diminishing in the foreseeable future. Even here in
England a quick tour of my local book shop revealed no fewer than 28
Civil War and related titles. For this reason, without extensive
research of primary material, it is very hard for an author to come
up with anything that has not been covered before. The potential
author is therefore faced with conducting painstaking primary
research, covering a less prominent aspect of the conflict, or,
alternatively places a novel interpretation on existing well-covered
fields of research, in an attempt to distinguish their book from all
the others on the shelf. Edward Bonekemper’s book is clearly one of
the latter.
The author is quite clear in his
introduction to How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War that the aim
of the book is to place a new interpretation on the contribution of
Robert Lee to the Confederate cause. In 248 pages he goes at this
aim with relish. Although the title of the book being what it is,
the student of military history will be aware before they open the
cover that whatever the merits of the book are, objectivity is not
going to be one of them.
The book is written in a fairly
brisk manner that flows quite well and does not get bogged down in
excessive detail, although the reason for this will quickly become
apparent. A minor criticism is the use of belittling language
throughout the book, such as “an obvious choice….”, “as usual for
Lee he….” And “instead of simply…..” although in the grand scheme of
the book this is a minor problem.
Before going on to address the main
body of the book it might be well to just state that I write this
review not as a rebuttal to the author’s claims but as an assessment
of its value as a fair conclusion to arrive at when reviewing all
the facts. In doing so I do not intend to whitewash Robert Lee, that
he made mistakes, sometimes costly ones is undeniable. The body of
recent literature is clear in moving away from his earlier portrayal
in the “Lost Cause” style of early post-war portrayals of him.
Furthermore I must point out I’m not a Southerner, I’m not even an
American, although I must admit to being an admirer of Lee and his
campaigns. I have no national or State allegiance to push, although
I should go on record as saying my best friend is a Virginian
(albeit one married to an Ohio girl and now living in Dayton) and
the source of my initial fascination with the Civil War. I do not
intend to influence any potential reader as to the right or wrong of
this book, I believe any serious student of the Civil War or
military history is quite capable of making their own minds up.
The main question to be addressed
is to what extent is the claim of the author based on sound
constructive evidence, objectively considered? The observant will
note that I do not say the conclusion of the author, as it is quite
apparent that the book’s conclusion came first and the body of the
book written to support that conclusion. It is quite apparent that
Edward Bonekemper is a lawyer, he builds a case for the prosecution
ignoring or minimizing all contrary evidence, leaving that to the
defense.
All writers of military history are
to some extent reliant on hindsight; it is the nature of the game so
to speak. However whilst hindsight may well help to show how things
happened it is rarely a useful guide as to why. A General in any war
is required to make decisions on the spot often at times of great
stress and confusion. He will make these decisions on information
and facts known to him at the time. Often it will turn out that the
information he does have is wrong. T he General does not have the
luxury of knowing what happened before he reaches his decision. As
already mentioned above, the author is prone to statements that
things were either obvious or there being a simpler way of doing
them. It is a weakness of the book that having said this he does not
investigate why, if a simpler alternative was so obvious, Lee did
not take it. Throughout the book no consideration is given to the
fact that what might appear obvious to the historian sitting in the
comfort of his study with all the facts to hand, might not be so
obvious to the General in the field in the heat of battle.
Many of the decisions made by Lee
and others are presented in the book without any reference to
external factors; military action does not occur in a vacuum and the
reason for doing something or the way that it is done can come down to
other factors. There is no assessment of what was intended, what was
hoped to be achieved or the factors influencing them.
It is a maxim of historical study
that an accusation should not just be made, it must be proven.
Throughout the book facts and accusations are made but not
investigated or proven. For example the often made claim that Lee
over-concentrated on the Virginia theatre at the expense of the
whole is again made. The author is not the first or last to make
this statement. However there is no investigation or assessment of
the strategic value of Virginia. No attempt is made to demonstrate
Virginia’s relevance or otherwise to the Confederate cause. Likewise
Lee’s position as senior military advisor to President Davis is not
assessed for the reality of the position but is stated at face
value. On a similar vein there is no discussion as to whether Lee,
after the dispatch west of the large forces the author states should
have been sent there, would have retained sufficient numbers to
defend Virginia. Furthermore there is no consideration given to the
logistics of supplying large additional forces in the West where the
Confederacy struggled to support the forces it did have.
The more serious reader with more
than a glancing knowledge of military affairs will be quickly aware
of the author’s lack of understanding of military maxims or his
decision to ignore them as unsupportive of his argument. There is no
consideration given to the importance of initiative, that often
attack is the best form of defense, concentration of resources, or, most importantly,
that military actions are difficult! It is a
well-known statement that no plan survives contact with the enemy.
It is very rare indeed for an opposing force to sit still and comply
exactly with how the plan requires them to. The enemy is trying to
win as much as you are. Too much of this book is concerned with
plans not going entirely to plan and sometimes not at all, this can
be the fault of the Generals but not entirely and rarely
exclusively.
Alarm bells will quickly sound in
the head of the objective reader when they start to encounter the
author’s description of the battles themselves and the planning for
them. The serious reader will quickly spot that a fair amount of
misrepresentation in their description is involved and the narrative
includes a fair amount of what we would today call “spin”. This
occurs from the start, for example the Mechanicsville battle in its
description is written in a way to suggest that Lee devised an
over-complicated plan to launch a series of frontal attacks. The
serious student is aware of the fact that the hoped for result of
the complicated approach march was to obtain the objective by
maneuver. Worryingly, at least three of the books listed in the
book’s bibliography make this abundantly clear.
Putting to one side the glaringly
obvious weaknesses in the author’s portrayal of events and lack of
contextual presentation for a moment, the serious historian
confronting the book’s main contention, that Lee should have known
that the South’s best chance of victory lay in Lincoln’s electoral
defeat in 1864, I have two observations.
Firstly, hindsight is the basis of
this position, although as the author quite rightly points out,
Lincoln’s potential electoral defeat was well known in the South as
a chance of victory, it is hindsight that leads the author to claim
it as the best chance. The author’s claim that Lee ignored this and
went for the win instead is quite puzzling; after all, logically,
isn't a
General who is not trying to win, surely trying to lose?
Furthermore, no explanation is given as to why Confederate strategy,
as the inferior power, should have obviously adopted a strategy of
endurance.
Secondly, and quite probably the
most obvious weakness of this book, the objective reader will note
the author fails to even justify his own recommendations. Adoption
of a passive defense in Virginia with a transfer of forces to the
West would have required the South to gradually retreat south
abandoning the economically vital Upper South. The well-informed
reader will immediately ask why, with her armies deep in the
Southern heartland earlier, with tangible results to show for the
cost in lives and success more easily discernable, would the
Northern population be more demoralized and inclined to elect a
peace at any cost President in 1864?
The author's opinions as to Lee
resigning once “defeat became obvious” shows a clear lack of
understanding of the main subject of the book: Robert Lee himself
and of Western military convention. It has long been standard in
Western Armies that whilst a General may offer his resignation, if
it is not accepted, he will continue. This is because, in a western
army, whilst a General has the right to resign his men do not, and as
a result Generals have traditionally considered resignation in
wartime desertion. To suggest Lee should have done what he would
undoubtedly have considered tantamount to desertion and abandoning
his post, shows a worryingly lack of knowledge about General Lee.
On the plus side, the book does
contain some useful statistics in regard to casualties. In many ways
casualty statistics is what the book boils down to. The casualty
figures reveal the terrible cost of the Civil War in particular and
warfare in general. Warfare is risky, if you do not want to suffer
casualties then do not fight wars. As is the case with the rest of
the book the author does of course view them as an abstract and not
in conjunction with any other factors. It should always be borne in
mind that no matter how thorough or clever the plan or maneuver,
there will always ultimately come a point when the infantry must
advance and engage the enemy. The historian is well aware of basing
any argument purely on statistics especially when they are viewed
out of context of all other consideration and influence on events.
In summary, the author has produced
a book based on misrepresentation, selective quotations, statistics
and misunderstanding to support an argument not fully thought
through or presented. Whilst the casual reader may find it useful,
the more serious or objective student of the civil war or military
historian will quite quickly observe it is not based upon a
realistic assessment of the situation or factors at the time.
Whatever the rights or wrongs of his argument the author has failed
to present a credible argument in this book. |
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